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Media markets recently have been identified as multisided markets. The appli-
cation of the theory of multisided markets provides a better understanding of 
such markets. It enriched the hitherto economic approach and led to new in-
sights and perspectives especially for the antitrust authorities when evaluating 
competition constraints and mergers. This paper reviews the theory of multi-
sided markets and subsequently applies it to media markets. Finally the paper 
draws attention to the new perspectives and insights the theory provides but 
also brings open research questions to light. 
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1.  Introduction 
During recent years the theory of two-sided, respectively multisided
1 markets, 
has been used to explain the work of various industries and provided new per-
spectives – for companies, for economists and also the antitrust policy 
(Dewenter 2006a: 7-9, Roson 2005: 143, 155f.). It has thereby been recognized 
that media markets and their functioning can also be better explained by using 
the theory of multisided markets. Media, respectively mass media, plays an im-
portant role in our society – people spend the majority of their (leisure) time 
with them (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 569). In Germany, for example, 
people were found to be using the media
2 for an average of 565 minutes per day 
in 2008 (BR online 2008). Mass media traditionally include television, radio 
and printed media, like newspapers and magazines. Since the 1990’s the inter-
net has been added as well. Nearly everybody uses at least one of those media 
types regularly, either watching the evening news on television, listening to the 
radio during the daytime, reading the newspaper in the morning or surfing the 
internet. The relevance of media markets becomes even clearer when we con-
sider that media can impart knowledge and can shape public opinion (Anderson 
& Gabszewicz 2006: 569). It is therefore essential to carefully analyze media 
markets from an economic and a political perspective. The aim of this paper is 
therefore to introduce the theory of multisided markets in order to establish a 
tool to analyze media markets. 
 
What is the difference between two-sided and one-sided markets? First of all 
using the term two-sided can be confusing. Basically, we are always facing two 
sides when analyzing markets – the demand side and the supply side. However, 
in the context of the theory something different is meant. Using the term mar-
kets with indirect network externalities seems to fit better (Dewenter & Haucap 
                                                            
1   In the following paper both the terms two-sided and multisided will be used when referring to the 
theory. 
2   Media in this term includes: television, radio, internet, newspapers, book, magazines, video, sound re-
cording media (BR online 2008).  
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2009: 36). The particular feature of the theory of multisided markets is that we 
actually face at least three participants – at least two market sides and a plat-
form. In the majority of cases both market sides represent demand sides. They 
are distinct but interdependent and therefore cannot be isolated from each other 
(Dewenter 2006a: 2). Take the media market, for example. A media company 
does not exclusively serve the audience by providing content. The platform ad-
ditionally serves the advertising industry by providing it with advertising space. 
Both market sides are thereby served simultaneously and furthermore affect 
each other at the same time through indirect network externalities. Whereas di-
rect network externalities affect the participants on the same side, indirect net-
work externalities come into effect by one (demand) side influencing the other 
(demand) side. If the demand on side A changes this would affect the demand 
on side B as well. This means that the utility of both sides depends either posi-
tively or negatively on how many participants are present on the other side 
(Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 36, Dewenter 2006b: 2). These peculiarities lead to 
new insights and perspectives on such markets. 
 
This paper aims to initially present the theory of multisided markets in general 
and eventually explains how it exactly applies to media markets. The paper will 
be structured as follows: In the next chapter the theory of multisided markets 
will be explained in general including the origin of the theory and the differ-
ences to one-sided markets. It will present the general characteristics of the the-
ory; introduce the participants faced on the markets, the market structure and 
the effects on prices, quantities and social welfare. In chapter 3 the theory of 
multisided markets will then concretely be applied to media markets. It will 
present the participants that can be observed on media markets and how they 
act together. It will thereby especially cope with the indirect network effects, 
how they come into effect on media markets and what influence they have on 
prices and quantities. Chapter 4 will subsequently focus on an analysis of the 
strengths and open research questions of the theory. What additional insights 
and perspectives does the theory provide by identifying multisided markets? 
The chapter will elaborate which aspects can be better explained or understood  
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by using the theory. It will thereby especially refer to essential implications for 
the antitrust policy. On the other hand it will deal with some problems we face 
and possible existing constraints that currently cannot be explained through the 
theory of multisided markets. Chapter 5 will present the conclusion.  
2.  The theory of multisided markets 
2.1.  Origin of the theory and further multisided markets 
The origin of the theory of two-sided respectively multisided markets lies in the 
credit card market – a market with particular characteristics. The development 
of the theory itself can especially be attributed to the antitrust law suits that 
were filed against MasterCard and Visa (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 36). The 
antitrust authorities of different countries accused MasterCard and Visa of hin-
dering competition with their price and fee setting for cardholders and mer-
chants (Evans 2002: 62-64; Evans 2004: 238-240, 268-271; Evans & 
Schmalensee 2005: 74-76; Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 156f, 169f.). 
 
Through analysing the credit card market more carefully, however particular 
characteristics were brought to light that demanded a different treatment than 
that according to one-sided markets – especially regarding economic and anti-
trust policy. The usual practices of antitrust authorities as they were known 
from one-sided markets seemed inapplicable to the credit card industry. The 
main finding from the credit card market was that it is actually possible to ob-
serve two market sides, respectively (demand) sides, which interact with and in-
fluence each other. The value of each (demand) side joining a platform is 
thereby determined by its expectations about the size on the opposite side (Ro-
son 2005: 142f., Evans 2004: 238).  
 
The participants we face in credit card markets are merchants (market side 1), 
customers (market side 2) as well as the credit card company (platform), which 
is offering the credit card. Thus, the credit card company has to offer its product  
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to two different groups. It has to persuade the merchants to accept the credit 
card in their shops and simultaneously has to persuade the customers to hold the 
card and use it for payment. Between market 1 and market 2 indirect network 
externalities do exist.
3 In the case of the credit card market the network exter-
nalities are positive for both sides. On the one hand, the more customers use a 
specific credit card (e.g. Visa Card) the more attractive it gets for the merchants 
to accept that card. On the other hand the more merchants accept the Visa card 
the more attractive it gets for the customers to sign up for it and use it. This ex-
ample clearly shows that the network effects influence the other side and there-
fore have an indirect effect (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 37, Roson 2005: 142f.). 
The credit card company eventually acts as a platform that is enabling and co-
ordinating the transactions between the two market sides. Due to the coupling 
of the credit card, the platform thereby has to achieve critical mass on each 
market side in order to attract the other. No trivial task for the company. Due to 
these interdependencies the company cannot attract one side without having 
enough customers on the other side. However, where should they start? Can one 
side be attracted if the other one is not yet there? The literature refers to the 
chicken-and-egg problem the platform here faces (Evans 2004: 237, 261, 276; 
Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 152f.; Caillaud & Jullien 2003: 310, Evans 2003: 
195). The work of the platforms will be an important issue in the following. 
 
However, other examples of multisided markets do also exist (see figure 1). 
Since considering the credit card market as multi-sided, further markets were 
identified to be two- or multi-sided as well. Hence, the theory of multisided 
markets emerged. Some other examples of such kinds of markets include shop-
ping malls, real estate agencies, dating agencies, software markets, videogame 
markets, sports markets and – as already mentioned before – media markets. All 
these markets are characterized by indirect network effects and can thus be ex-
plained using the theory of multisided markets (Dewenter 2006b: 1; Evans & 
Schmalensee 2007: 152). In the predominant cases we do face positive indirect 
                                                            
3   In general these indirect network externalities can be either positive or negative and finally cause the 
market to be two-sided (Dewenter 2006b: 1f.).  
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network externalities for each market side. With the shopping mall example this 
would mean that the more shops that are present in a mall, the more attractive it 
becomes for consumers to go there. At the same time the more consumers a 
shopping mall has the more attractive it becomes for shop owners to open a 
store. On the real estate market, the more properties real estate agents have on 
their books, the greater the number of potential buyers who will go there, and 
vice versa. Again, the effects are positive for both sides. However, negative ex-
ternalities can and do also occur. Take the media market, for example. As soon 
as the audience regards advertisements as a nuisance, the advertising industry 
would exert a negative externality on the audience. This means, the more adver-
tisers there are on the market, the fewer readers (listeners or watchers) will be 
attracted (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 571). Network externalities and their 
effects will be discussed in detail later in this paper.  
 
Figure 1.  Extended illustration according to Budzinski & Satzer 2009: 8 
Market/Intermediary  Distinct customer groups 
Externalities 
(examples) 
Transaction systems (e.g. credit cards)  a)  Merchants (accepting the 
credit card as payment) 
b)  Consumers (using the credit 
card for payment) 
a   b  
b   a  
Matching agencies (e.g. employment 
agencies, dating agencies, travel agencies) 
a)  Unemployed / male singles  
b)  Companies with vacancies / 
female singles 
a   b  
b   a  
Brokers, e.g. estate agents and intermedia-
ries, (e.g. real estate agents, exchange 
markets, auction houses) 
a)  House owners wishing to sell  
b)  Potential buyers 
a   b  
b   a  
Media markets (e.g. magazines, newspa-
pers, commercial television, commercial 
radio) 
a)  Audience 
b)  Advertising market 
a   b  
b   a  (?)  
12 
 
Software platforms (e.g. operating systems)  a)  Application software devel-
opers  
b)  Software users 
a   b  
b   a  
Videogame markets  a)  Game developers 
b)  Players 
a   b  
b   a  
Shopping malls   a)  Shops 
b)  Consumers 
a   b  
b   a  
Professional sports markets   a)  Audience (in the arenas) 
b)  Sponsors, advertisers  




2.2.  Defining multisided markets 
This section will define and analyze the theory of multisided markets in more 
detail. The theory actually combines two different well-known theories, on the 
one hand the theory of (market or regulated) multi-product pricing and on the 
other hand the theory of network externalities (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 646). 
From the first theory it borrows the notion of focusing on price structure and 
emphasizes that price structures are more distorted by price levels than by mar-
ket power. By contrast the theory of network externalities states that external-
ities are not internalized between the end-users. 
 
According to Roson (2005) “a market is two-sided if platforms serve two 
groups of agents, such that the participation of at least one group raises the 
value of participating for the other group.” Rochet & Tirole (2006) speak of a 
two-sided market “in which one or several platforms enable interactions be-
tween end-users and try to get the two (or multiple) sides ‘on board’ by appro-
priately charging each side”. As it was pointed out earlier, the use of the term 
“two-sided” could cause confusion as nearly every market then would be two-
sided. We always face demand and supply sides and the overall aim is to get 
buyer and seller together for transactions. More precisely, therefore, Rochet and  
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Tirole (2006) define a market as two-sided “if the platform can affect the vol-
ume of transactions by charging more to one side of the market and reducing 
the price paid by the other side by an equal amount; in other words, the price 
structure matters, and platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on 
board”. In order to provide a clearer distinction between one-sided and multi-
sided markets, we can say that a market is one-sided if the volume of transac-
tion V depends only on the total price a (aggregate price level). In contrast, a 
market is said to be two-sided if the volume of transactions V depends or varies 
with the price of the buyer a(b) or the price of the seller a(s). In other words the 
moment the price structure is changed in multi-sided markets but the total price 
a is kept constant, there will be an effect on the participation level and the vol-
ume of transactions (Roson 2005: 144, Rochet & Tirole 2006: 648). 
 
According to Evans & Schmalensee (2007) a multi-sided market exists when 
the following criteria are met: 
 
 There are two or multiple distinct customer groups.  
 Externalities exist between these two customer groups.  
 These externalities cannot be internalized between the customer groups. 
In other words “the relationship between end-users must be fraught with 
residual externalities”. 
2.3.  Participants and their goals 
Which participants are faced on multisided markets? There are at least three dif-
ferent groups (see figure 2):  
 
 The platform 
 Market side 1 (agents)  
 Market side 2 (agents)  
  
14 
Figure 2.  Own graph, source Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 38 
 
 
The participants are connected to each other; though they do have different in-
tentions and goals: As the term multisided already states we initially face at 
least two groups of agents (market side 1 and market side 2). These groups are 
distinct, meaning that they act on different markets; however they are interde-
pendent (Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 152). The market sides influence each 
other through the already mentioned positive or negative indirect network ex-
ternalities (Roson 2005: 144). No matter which exact market is faced, both 
market sides aim to maximize their utility and consider this when deciding 
whether or which platform to join. In the case of the credit card market the mer-
chant wants to maximize profits through selling his products to the customer. 
He therefore needs to offer his customers different payment systems, including 
credit cards. The merchant will thereby choose to accept the credit card that 
most of the consumers hold and thus joins the respective platform (credit card 
company). The aim of the customer is to purchase products easily. Through 
holding a credit card he can purchase goods cashless. The consumer in turn 
would always choose the credit card (platform) that is accepted by the most 
merchants. This is where the platform comes into play. The different goals of 
the market sides are brought together by the platform who then appropriately 
charges all sides. The final usage decisions by both market sides depend on  
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what the platform charges to them (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 647). Thus, the plat-
form is the third participant in multisided markets and acts as a coordinator that 
is bringing the market sides and their activities together, and subsequently ena-
bling the transactions between them (Rochet & Tirole 2004: 5; Evans 2004: 
237). The platform reduces information and transaction costs for both market 
sides that emerge from finding and interacting with each other. In other words 
the platform internalizes externalities that the market sides are not able to inter-
nalize on their own. By bringing the market sides together the platform in-
creases the gains from trade (Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 152, 158; Evans 
2004: 243, 290).  
 
The actual interaction of the market sides can be anything depending on the 
market we are talking about. We have seen that on credit card markets, for ex-
ample, the interaction occurs when a cardholder (market side 1) pays with the 
credit card at a merchants’ place (market side 2). On the software market an in-
teraction would occur if a user (market side 1) buys the software that the devel-
oper on the other side (market side 2) has developed (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 
645). The platform has different methods for reducing transaction costs. Due to 




1. Market-Makers enable members of distinct groups to transact with 
each other (e.g. shopping malls; the platform brings together retail shops 
and customers. Thereby both, the value of the shops increases the more 
customers can be found and the value of customers increases with a 
greater number of shops). 
 
                                                            
4   Depending on the market we are talking about the measures matchmaking, building audiences or 
minimizing costs occur. The platform uses mainly one of them to reduce transaction costs. However, 
most platforms use each method to some degree (Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 158).  
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2. Audience-Makers match advertisers to audiences (e.g. yellow pages 
market; the platform brings advertising and audience together. Thereby 
the audience values more advertising companies and vice versa). 
 
3. Demand-Coordinators make goods and services that generate indi-
rect network effects across two or more groups (e.g. credit card mar-
ket; the platform enables the transaction both for merchants and consum-
ers through offering the actual payment card). 
 
Every platform aims to maximize profits (Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 160). 
Through operating on two or multiple sides the platform gets its profits from 
two or more industries at the same time (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 570). 
In contrast to one-sided markets the platform has to provide both (multiple) 
groups in order to create demand from any of them (Evans 2004: 246). It sets 
prices and/or quantities for both sides and has to figure out how to charge each 
side appropriately in order to get all parties on board and hence receive money 
from all participated sides. Thereby prices can be either membership or usage 
fees, or both (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 647; Evans 2004: 237).  
2.4.  Indirect Network Externalities 
A market is said to be multisided as soon as indirect network externalities do 
exist on both sides (Dewenter 2006b: 1).
5 In contrast to direct network external-
ities where the consumption of agents on side A depends on the consumption of 
agents from the same side (A) the indirect network externalities come into ef-
fect when the consumption of agents on side A depends on the consumption 
(better: the network size) of agents from the other (opposite) side B (Roson 
2005: 144). Thus, the utility of one side increases through an extension on par-
ticipants on the other market side and in turn influences its decision whether to 
join a platform (Amstrong 2006: 668). For example, when joining a dating 
                                                            
5   If the network externalities would only come into effect from one side we would not face a multisided 
but a one-sided market (Dewenter 2006b:2).  
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agency the singles on the men’s side will – additionally to the price considera-
tions – always consider how many female singles they will face on the other 
side. If a consumer is deciding for a credit card he would figure out which 
credit card is accepted by as many merchants as possible and hence join the 
platform that offers this card. An important aspect in multisided markets is that 
the network externalities cannot be internalized (see section 2.2). This means 
that the two market sides cannot make side-payments, i.e. interact with each 
other directly. Instead, the platform is taking over this task. Through using the 
externalities the platform thereby enables transactions between the market sides 
and aims to maximize profits (Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 154, 160; Roson 
2005: 144). Therefore, it is important that the platform has a solid knowledge of 
the network externalities – especially its strengths and relations – in order to use 
them optimally and price each market side appropriately (Dewenter 2006b: 3; 
Rochet & Tirole 2004: 1).
6 Thus, in any case the platform will always aim to 
take advantage of the positive externalities and limit the negative ones (Evans 
& Schmalensee 2007: 163). 
 
Depending on whether usage or membership fees (or even both) the market 
sides pay to the platforms we face membership or usage externalities. When 
agents have to pay ex ante for the transaction they pay a fixed fee regardless of 
the following transaction. In the case of the credit card market the cardholder 
for example pays a yearly fee for holding the card. The merchant benefits from 
this insofar as people more frequently use this card since they already paid for 
it. Therefore, merchants experience a positive membership externality from the 
consumer side. On the other hand when agents have to pay ex post for transac-
tions we talk of usage fees. Taking the credit card market for example, the con-
sumer does not have to pay any usage fee for transaction (hence he only bene-
fits from using the card) whereas the merchant pays a so-called merchants dis-
count. Therefore, the merchant exerts a positive usage externality on the con-
                                                            
6   The importance of the strengths and relations of the indirect network externalities for price setting will 
be one of the issues coped with in more detail in 2.5.  
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sumers through accepting the credit card (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 647; Arm-
strong 2006: 669). 
 
As already pointed out earlier, in the predominant cases we face positive net-
work externalities in multisided markets (see also figure 1). This means, one 
side profits from the other side and vice versa. The more participants that exist 
on one side will result to move (increase) participants on the other side as their 
utility increases with the opposite side (Roson 2005: 142). This will further-
more have a positive feedback effect on the other side again and so forth. How-
ever, negative externalities do exist as well; for example with media markets. 
Chapter 3 will refer to media markets in more detail. The effects that network 
externalities exert on the price setting will be pointed out in the following sec-
tion. 
2.5.  Price setting and social welfare in multisided markets 
2.5.1.  Platform’s price setting 
When coping with prices, which platforms set on multisided markets, we first 
of all have to distinguish between variable charges and fixed charges. The latter 
one affects the presence of each market side on the platform whereas the vari-
able charges have an influence on each market sides’ willingness to trade on the 
platform. In the case of the credit card market the variable charge (ex post pay-
ment) would be the merchant discount a merchant is charged for every transac-
tion. A fixed charge (ex ante payment) on the other hand would be the yearly 
membership fee a consumer has to pay for holding a credit card without having 
used it yet (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 646f.; Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 160f.; 
Caillaud & Jullien 2003: 310). In the real estate market both market sides – 
house sellers and potential house buyers – would have to pay a variable charge 
to the platform as soon as the interaction has taken place. 
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Pricing principles in multisided markets clearly differ from those in one-sided 
markets. In contrast to one-sided markets, platforms have to consider the inter-
dependent demands of all sides when deciding on the appropriate pricing strat-
egy (Evans 2004: 238).
7 The definition respectively the characteristics that 
cause a market to be multisided clearly showed that the price structure matters 
for transactions (see section 2.2). The structure of prices influences profits and 
the economic efficiency (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 648). For maximizing profits 
price setting of the platform does not have to follow marginal costs (Evans & 
Schmalensee 2007: 152). Instead, in order to get both sides on board, the plat-
form must carefully determine which side can be charged at what price. It is 
important to find out how much each side can bear as the distribution of prices 
has an influence on market participation of each market side and hence the vol-
ume of demand (Roson 2005: 142). 
 
As well-known from one-sided markets, companies which are setting prices 
have to consider price elasticities of demand and marginal costs – in multisided 
markets this has to be done for every market side (Dewenter 2006b: 3; Evans & 
Schmalensee 2007: 159f.). However, in multisided markets especially the indi-
rect network externalities, which cause a market to be multisided, plays an es-
sential role for pricing strategies. They have to be taken into account carefully 
by the platform. Consider a two-sided market where the platform plans to 
change prices. Between both market sides A and B network externalities do ex-
ist. If the platform (e.g. dating agencies) increases the price for market side A 
(e.g. female singles) this initially result in fewer As joining the platform. As 
well-known from one-sided markets the relationship between price and number 
of participants depends on the price elasticity of demand. We now assume that 
market side A exerts a positive externality on market side B (e.g. male singles), 
which means that side B values the members on side A. Then, the decreasing 
number of members on side A would also lead to a decrease in members on 
side B. As long as market side B in turn also exerts a positive externality on 
                                                            
7   In addition to this, these interdependent demands also need to be considered regarding production and 
investment strategies (Evans 2004: 238).  
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market side A, fewer participants on side B will lessen the number of members 
on side A once more and so forth. This effect is known as the feedback loop be-
tween the two sides (Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 159). Concisely, presuming 
positive externalities on both sides, a price increase (decrease) on one side will 
first of all result in a demand decrease (increase) on that side (direct effect of 
the price elasticity of demand) and secondly will cause a decrease (increase) in 
demand on both market sides due to the indirect externality effects (Evans & 
Schmalensee 2007: 159f.).
8 However, the concrete resulting effects due to price 
changes depend on the strength of network externalities and whether these net-
work effects are positive or negative for each side. Therefore, they have to be 
determined carefully in each particular case.  
 
We have to be aware that in the majority of cases the two market sides do not 
exert the same (strength of) externality on the opposite side. As long as the 
network externalities differ in relation to cost structure, market size and price 
elasticity the prices for the market sides will be different as well (Dewenter & 
Haucap 2009: 45). Usually one side exerts a stronger externality effect on the 
opposite market side. In order to reach the most profitable overall pricing the 
platform thus has to have a solid knowledge of the indirect network effects on 
the one hand and especially on their relative effects on the other hand. Pre-
dominantly,  prices will be lower on the market side that exerts a relatively 
strong effect on both markets (Dewenter 2006b: 3). Through lowering prices on 
the side that creates a significant externality on the other one, this side gets at-
tracted to join the platform which in turn makes it profitable for the platform 
(Rochet & Tirole 2006: 659). For example, a dating agency that has more male 
customers will impose a higher price to them. In order to attract the female cus-
tomers they in contrast will have to pay a lower price. The relative network ef-
fects can even result in negative prices for one market side. However if negative 
prices cannot be set just one of the multiple market sides – the one with the 
smaller network externality effect – will have to take the (whole) price burden. 
                                                            
8   For a more theoretical explanation of the mentioned effects on elasticities and demand functions refer 
to Evans & Schmalensee (2007) pp 159-161.  
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The other side on the contrary then would not be charged at all (Roson 2005: 
147f.).
9 The optimal price set by the platform on one side of the market thus 
does not seem to follow marginal costs. For a better understanding of the multi-
sided markets and possible judgements by the antitrust authorities the second 
market side always has to be taken into account as well. When talking about 
multisided markets we usually face a situation where – according to marginal 
costs – one side of the market is charged quite high whereas the other one is 
charged little or even nothing. This, however, is neither a given sign for market 
power nor for predatory pricing (Evans 2004: 238). Chapter 4 will show in 
more detail that antitrust authorities will have to evaluate price setting in multi-
sided markets differently to those in one-sided markets.  
2.5.2.  Resulting effects of price setting on social welfare  
Closely connected to price setting is social welfare. It plays an important role – 
especially with regard to antitrust policy. Social welfare is taken into considera-
tion when evaluating market structures, competitive situations and identifying 
possible restraints of competition. However, the results in multisided markets 
have to be judged differently to those in one-sided markets. The price structure 
is non-neutral in these markets; for this reason the composition of prices mat-
ters. It was just stated that prices below costs for example are not automatically 
a sign of predatory pricing. In the same way prices above marginal costs do not 
automatically imply market power (Roson 2005: 155f.; Dewenter 2006a: 5; Ev-
ans 2004: 267-271, 280).  
 
As with price setting, social welfare in multisided markets also depends on sev-
eral more aspects than in one-sided markets. In addition to market size, cost 
structure and price elasticities the strengths of indirect network externalities 
again have to be taken into account very carefully. Due to indirect network ex-
ternalities a monopolistic market structure might even lead to a higher social 
                                                            
9   This can for example be observed in the markets of Yellow Pages directories that are provided to the 
households for free while only the advertisers are charged (Holland 2007: 7f.).  
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welfare than a competitive environment. When analyzing social welfare in mul-
tisided markets we have to cope with a competition effect and a market exten-
sion effect, which lead into opposite directions. Both effects are influenced by 
the strengths of indirect network externalities and the intensity of competition. 
In a competitive market the quantities in total (quantity of all competitors) are – 
compared to the quantity of a monopolist – higher on both market sides as long 
as we face positive externalities. In this case the producer surplus for each sin-
gle competitor will be smaller. However, due to competition the consumer sur-
plus would increase and hence social welfare as well (competition effect).
10 In a 
monopolistic situation this one company has a bigger quantity than each single 
supplier would have in a competitive environment. Hence, the monopolist could 
use (internalize) the (positive) network externalities better than with competi-
tion. In the case of positive externalities both sides will profit from more par-
ticipants on the other side and vice versa. Thereby, the market side that profits 
more from the network externalities will then be willed to pay even more for 
joining the platform (market extension effect) (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 44f.; 
Budzinski & Lindstädt 2009: 12f.).
11 
 
To conclude, analyzing social welfare in multisided markets is quite complex. It 
is not possible to put a general statement which market structure leads to more 
social welfare. It is always necessary to carefully analyze each situation indi-
vidually. Antitrust authorities have to keep this in mind, when coping with mul-
tisided markets. This is also essential when evaluating mergers and acquisitions. 
Chapter 4 will refer to this part in more detail. 
2.6.  Multihoming 
Multihoming in multisided markets means that some agents – either just on one 
side of the market or even on both sides – stick to more than one platform 
                                                            
10   This leads to a movement on the demand curve which in turn results in an increase of the consumer 
surplus (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 44). 
11   This leads to a shift of the demand curve to the right (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 44).  
23 
(Rochet & Tirole 2003: 991f.). In the example of the credit card market card-
holders would multihome as soon as they hold more than one credit card. On 
the other hand merchants typically also multihome insofar as they accept not 
just one credit card but various cards. Regarding agencies, people who want to 
sell their houses usually will mandate more than one real estate agent. In the 
same way house buyers would not just stick to one real estate agency when 
looking for houses. However, in the software market we usually face multihom-
ing just on one side. Developers write for various software platforms, whereas 
end-users usually stick to one software product exclusively (Evans & 
Schmalensee 2007: 166). The decision for a market side to multihome usually 
depends on the price that is set by the platform. If the platform sets fixed fees it 
is less attractive to multihome. However, if only variable (per transaction) fees 
occur multihoming gets attractive for the market sides. In any market multi-
homing has an impact on the degree of competition. The platform faces more 
competition, either just from one side or from both. This in turn could have 
positive effects on the prices for the multihoming market side (Roson 2005: 
151f.). Multihoming is quite common
12 – however, it usually makes the analysis 
of such markets more complex.  
3.  Media markets as multisided markets 
After the theory of multisided markets has been explained in detail this chapter 
will finally apply it concretely to media markets. Why do we face two-
sidedness on media markets, who are the exact participants and how do they in-
teract with each other? Before applying the theory of multisided markets to me-
dia markets the traditional media economic
13 approach was analogical to the 
traditional competition analysis by defining the relevant markets. The analysis 
thereby also identified two relevant markets of media companies – advertising 
                                                            
12   For a more detailed overview on examples of two-sided markets where multihoming is common for 
at least one market side see also Evans 2003 (199). 
13   For general literature on media economics see for example: Heinrich (2001), Hoskins et. al (2004), 
Beck (2005), Beyer & Carl (2008).  
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market and audience market. However, these markets were defined and ana-
lyzed separately and not brought into connection with each other sufficiently. 
Although, the traditional economic approach discovered a connection between 
advertising and audience market – also known as the circulation spiral
14 that 
was predominantly applied to newspaper markets. The theory of two-sided 
markets however is continuing and widening the perspective and provides an 
even more detailed approach for media markets (Dewenter 2006a: 1, Dewenter 
& Haucap 2009: 36). Through the direct connection of advertising and audience 
market right from the beginning when analysing the relevant markets it clearly 
brings interdependencies – respectively indirect network externalities – to light 
and hence provides new perspectives. The well-known circulation spiral can 
thus be finally attributed to the existence of these indirect network externalities 
(Dewenter 2006b: 1). 
3.1.  The participants on media markets and their intentions 
Figure 3 specifies the participants we face on media markets according to the 
more general figure 2 that has already been introduced in Chapter 2: 
 
                                                            
14   With the circulation spiral positive effects for both participants – readership and advertising industry – 
were assumed: An increase in the demand for newspapers (increasing readership) results in an ex-
tended circulation of the newspaper. This in turn leads to a price decrease for advertisements (usually 
measured in cost per thousand (CPT)). Consequently, more advertising companies would demand for 
advertising space since they are reaching more readers to a lower price. Subsequently increased ad-
vertising leads to another increase in the demand for newspapers by the readership. This increase 
could be caused by two reasons: either, because the readers value advertisements, or because the pub-
lishing house has improved the quality (e.g. hiring better journalists) of the newspaper due to addi-
tional profits. Depending on the strengths of the effects the spiral goes on (Dewenter 2006a; Dewenter 
2003; Heinrich 2001).  
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Figure 3.  Own graph, source Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 38 
 
 
In media markets the two-sidedness is reflected by the concurrence of media 
companies (platform), the audience (market side 1) and the advertising industry 
(market side 2). The audience thereby simultaneously acts as prospective con-
sumers for the advertising industry. Audience and advertising industry are inter-
related with each other (Dewenter 2003: 3). However, they follow different 




15 (market side 1) can be either readers of newspapers, watchers 
and listeners of television and radio programmes or users of the internet. Their 
goal is to consume the media content – news, information or entertainment – of-
fered by the media company. Thereby the audience predominantly wants to get 
access to these programs without any disturbance in the form of advertisements 
(Anderson & Gabzsewicz 2006: 571). On the other hand we face the advertis-
ing industry
16 (market side 2) meaning companies that advertise in different 
                                                            
15   Also called primary market (Dewenter 2003: 2). 
16   Also called secondary market (Dewenter 2003: 2).  
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types of media in order to promote their products, services or companies. Their 
final goal is to make and maximize profits through getting consumers to buy 
their products. By advertising in different media types such as newspaper, TV, 
radio or the internet, the company aims to reach as many potential consumers as 
possible which they have defined as their target group in advance. Thus, it is 
not the primary aim to reach as many people but to identify and catch the right 
people (Dewenter 2003: 17). In order to reach the right target group it is fur-
thermore necessary for the advertising industry to figure out over which media 
type and within this over which media program this can be accomplished. The 
third participant is finally the media company (platform) which can be a pub-
lishing house, a television, a radio or an internet company. It finally provides a 
medium that is necessary to enable any transaction between both market sides 
since the media company sells two products – media content to the audience 
and advertising space to the advertising industry (Anderson & Gabszewicz 
2006: 569f.; Ferrando & Gabszewicz 2003: 1). Due to the interdependencies of 
the audience and the advertising market the platform acts as an intermediary or 
coordinator (Dewenter 2006a: 2). In order to get both these sides on board the 
platform brings together the different goals of the advertising and the audience 
side by appropriately charging them (Rochet & Tirole 2006: 645). It sets a price 
for the audience (e.g. copy price) and another one for the advertising industry 
(e.g. advertising price). An interaction between two market sides would occur 
when the readership (side A) of a newspaper spots the advertisement of a com-
pany (side B) and takes it into account when making a purchase decision. In the 
end it is the platforms overall aim to realize and maximize profits. The profits 
are finally received from both market sides (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 
570, 579; Kaiser & Wright: 2006: 2). However, bringing both market sides to-
gether does not seem trivial. Therefore it is essential for the platform to opti-
mally use the indirect network externalities from all sides.   
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3.2.  How indirect network externalities work 
As pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, the impact of indirect network 
externalities in media markets has already been partly described over the circu-
lation spiral for several years (esp. for newspapers). So, how do the indirect 
network externalities exactly come into effect on media markets and in what 
way can the media platform optimally use them to enable transactions between 
the two market sides? On media markets we face two-sided indirect network ef-
fects between the audience and the advertising market. Again, these network 
externalities need to be identified on both sides. Thereby it does not matter if 
the effect is either positive or negative (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 579f.; 
Ferrando & Gabszewicz 2003: 2, Dewenter 2006b: 2). After predominantly dis-
cussing the positive externalities in the previous chapter, we now face a market 
where both – positive and negative externalities – can and do exist (Dewenter & 
Haucap 2009: 37; Schmidtke 2006: 5).  
 
The advertising industry on the one hand will exclusively receive positive indi-
rect network externalities from the audience side (Dewenter 2007: 55). This 
means that the advertising industry will always benefit from a bigger network 
size of the audience. As soon as the number of readers (respectively viewers or 
users) increases, this will have a positive effect on the advertising side and in 
turn will enlarge their network size as well. The reason lies in the following: the 
more advertising the audience “consumes” the more likely it is that they will 
become a potential customer of the advertising companies. For this, the adver-
tising industry is willed to pay (more) money (Crampes et al. 2005: 1). The au-
dience thus influences the utility for the advertising side – not for itself. On the 
other hand, with what exact type of network externalities we are coping on the 
audience side depends on how the audience views advertising and cannot be 
answered in a lump sum. If the audience views advertising as something good 
(e.g. informative or helpful advertisements) they will also benefit from a larger 
number of (advertising) participants on the opposite side (positive indirect net-
work externality). An increase in advertising would result in a bigger audience  
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as well. An example could be advertising in newspapers; interesting ads could 
be viewed, uninteresting ones can be easily skipped. However, if the audience 
regards advertising as a nuisance we would face a negative indirect network ex-
ternality. An increase in advertising would then lead to a decline in the audi-
ence size. In other words less advertising would then attract more people. Ad-
vertising on television or on the internet, for example, is often associated with 
negative network effects as it interrupts the actual programme. The audience 
can avoid it only through switching to another program (Dewenter 2006a: 3f.; 
Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 571.; Ferrando & Gabszewicz 2003: 1f.). The 
multisidedness of markets or more precise the existence of indirect network ex-
ternalities has consequences on quantities. The quantities in media markets can 
be higher than those faced on one-sided markets as long as in total positive indi-
rect network externalities do exist. However, as soon as negative effects domi-
nate on such media market the quantities offered on the markets would be lower 
than in one-sided markets (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 37-39). 
3.3.  Price setting in media markets  
3.3.1.  Some general implications on price setting in multisided media 
markets 
Regardless of the market structure which will be analyzed in more detail in 
3.3.2 initially some general statements about price setting in media markets: 
take the newspaper market, for example, and assume that for both sides positive 
indirect network externalities exist. The readers exert high indirect network ef-
fects on the advertising market. That is the more readers notice the advertising 
the more probable they will become potential buyers of the products. This ef-
fect is usually stronger then the effect the advertising industry exerts on the 
readership.
17 A high(er) readership will therefore make advertising more attrac-
tive and lead to an increase in the demand for advertising space and thus to high 
                                                            
17   However, since we assume positive network externalities on both sides, also the readers profit from 
advertising (e.g. through getting product information) that helps them to make purchase decisions.  
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revenues for the platform. In order to get a bigger readership the media com-
pany has to make the newspaper attractive – one possible action is to set attrac-
tive, respectively low(er), prices. These prices could be even below marginal 
costs which are then balanced through higher prices on the advertising side. As 
the indirect network externalities of the advertising side do not have such a 
strong impact on the reader side price changes or higher price setting is more at-
tractive on the advertising side. Even if advertisers change their behaviour (e.g. 
less demand due to a price increase) this will not cause a significant damage to 
the readership. The advertising industry will usually bear higher prices since 
they profit anyway. When the readers pay quite low prices this will result in a 
bigger readership which in turn is useful for the advertising side because of the 
ability to reach more potential customers (Dewenter 2006a: 3-5; Rochet & Ti-
role 2003: 1015). Depending on the strengths of positive externalities the adver-
tising side exerts on the reader side there will be a feedback effect. That is more 
advertising will attract more readers, which in turn result in another positive ef-
fect on the advertising side. When considering the television market the indirect 
network effects however can be both, positive and negative. Whereas the view-
ers exert the familiar positive effect on the advertising industry the advertising 
industry can exert a positive or a negative effect on the viewers. Advertisements 
disturb the viewers from watching the TV programme without any interruption 
and hence are often seen as a nuisance (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006: 571, 
586). As soon as a media company faces this situation it will set eminently high 
prices on the advertising side in order to outbalance the negative effects for the 
viewer side (Dewenter 2006a: 5).
 18 
  
To conclude, when a media company is setting prices or considering price 
changes it is not enough to focus on price elasticities of demand, marginal costs 
and market structures exclusively. Instead it is especially the indirect network 
externalities the company must always cope with. It needs to have a solid 
knowledge of their strengths and relations (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 38). This 
                                                            
18   Like in any other multisided market also platforms on media markets will always take advantage of 
the positive externalities and try to avoid the negative ones (Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 163).  
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means the platform has to anticipate what effect a price change on one side will 
have on the other side. Rising prices only makes sense as long as the utility out-
balances a possible resulting damage. Due to this, a price should only be in-
creased on the market that exerts fewer or lower (positive) indirect network ex-
ternalities than the other market side. Hence, media companies usually set low 
prices on the audience side (Dewenter 2006a: 4f.). Oftentimes, this results in 
cross-subsidization which we mainly face in media markets. In the newspaper 
market, for example, the readership is subsidized. Profits come mainly from the 
advertising side; in doing so the advertising industry is subsidizing the copy 
price of the readership (Kaiser & Wright 2006: 23; Rochet & Tirole 2003: 
1015). As it was already pointed out in section 2.5.1 the existence of indirect 
network effects can go to such lengths that prices on one side will be zero 
whereas the other side has to take the whole price burden. In media markets this 
would, for example, apply to gratis newspapers.  
3.3.2.  Price setting in different market structures 
However, when dealing with price setting and its effects on multisided media 
markets we have to make a distinction between (more) monopolistic and com-
petitive (mainly oligopolistic) markets. Market structure is quite an interesting 
issue in media markets. These markets are characterized by high fixed costs re-
spectively sunk costs and large economies of scale. Additionally, the indirect 
network externalities play an important role. All parameters result in high bar-
riers of entry and cause many media markets to be quite concentrated. This in 
turn concerns the antitrust policies because of possible anti-competitive beha-
vior (Dewenter 2003: 19; Dewenter 2007: 53; Evans 2004: 266f.). 
 
We already learned that as soon as we face a monopolistic market structure
19 
the media company logically consistent does not have to consider competition 
effects but can exclusively focus on the indirect network externalities. The mo-
                                                            
19   A monopolistic structure is predominantly faced on regional newspaper markets (Dewenter & Hau-
cap 2009: 40).  
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nopolist will use high (positive) indirect network effects from one side (usually 
the readership) to lower the prices on this side. In turn, prices on the market 
with lower (or even negative) externalities (i.e. the advertising industry) will be 
higher (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 40). Take the newspaper market, for exam-
ple. The publishing house will focus on the externalities exclusively. When the 
circulation (in other words the audience) exerts a strong impact on the advertis-
ing side the latter ones value the quantity of readers. Thus, the publishing house 
would set high(er) prices for advertising space. The readership in contrast will 
be charged a quite low or even negative price and consequently will be subsi-
dized by the advertising side. Through using the interdependencies of advertis-
ing- and audience market– a monopolistic media company can maximize its 
profits (Dewenter 2006b: 5-8; 13). However, on an oligopolistic media market 
the media companies have to additionally consider competition effects. The 
firms are now facing competition regarding prices and quantities. Hence, the re-
sulting quantities of each single media firm will be lower than in a monopolistic 
market whereas the total quantity (of all competitors together) in such an envi-
ronment will be higher. Competition usually leads to a price decrease. How-
ever, with competition each single media company cannot internalize the net-
work externalities to the same extent that a monopolistic media company is able 
to do. Consequently, prices on oligopolistic media markets could be even 
higher than in a monopolistic structure (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 41). Never-
theless, analyzing different market structures is a complex task. As long as not 
every market parameter is thoroughly known, a final evaluation of prices is nei-
ther possible nor advisable.  
3.3.3.  Price setting and its effects on social welfare 
What consequences does the price setting of the media company have on social 
welfare? The above mentioned concentration tendencies in media markets due 
to high sunk costs and large economies of scale make this analysis an essential 
but no trivial task for antitrust authorities. As it was already pointed out in the 
previous chapter (see 2.5.2) there are two effects in media markets that appear  
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and lead to opposite directions: the competition effect and the market extension 
effect. Thus, in the same way as with price setting, all relevant market parame-
ters have to be well known and analyzed carefully before making a statement on 
social welfare. This means that pricing the audience side little whereas the 
prices on the advertising side are set higher does not automatically imply less 
social welfare. High prices (e.g. above marginal costs) or profits are neither a 
given sign for market power nor do extremely low prices (e.g. below marginal 
costs) automatically imply predatory pricing. Rather these prices and profits are 
connected with the peculiarities of media markets. These are predominantly in-
direct network externalities as well as high fixed costs. Again it is indispensable 
to consider both market sides and their interdependencies before coming to a 
conclusion on social welfare. In the majority of cases it is one media market 
side that subsidizes the opposite media market side. This in turn means that a 
monopolistic structure (on one side) or at least market structures with little 
competition can be efficient and probably lead to more social welfare than me-
dia markets with perfect competition (Dewenter 2003: 18; Dewenter 2006b: 
13f.; Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 44f.; Evans 2004: 266f.). 
3.4.  Multihoming in media markets 
As we have learned in the previous chapter multihoming occurs as soon as one 
market side adapt to more than one platform. This is faced in the majority of 
cases in media markets. The advertising industry almost always multihomes. By 
doing so the companies try to maximize their media coverage, i.e. try to reach 
as many (potential) customers as possible. On the one hand multihoming can 
occur within the same media type (e.g. advertising in different newspapers). On 
the other hand the companies can also multihome among different media types 
(e.g. advertising in newspapers, television, and internet). The audience can also 
multihome. This is the case if some consumers read different newspapers or 
watch different TV channels.  
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Multihoming intensifies competition for the media platform. As soon as both 
market sides multihome any market side can easily switch to other platforms. 
Hence, prices could be lower since the media platforms encounter competitive 
pressure when setting prices. On the other hand, as soon as only one side multi-
homes (e.g. advertisers) the prices on the opposite side (e.g. audience) could in-
crease (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 42; Wotton 2007: 238f.).  
4.  Strengths of the theory and open research questions  
4.1.  New perspectives and insights with the theory of multisided markets 
It was shown in the previous chapters that multisided markets clearly differ 
from one-sided markets. One of the most relevant differences is the existence of 
indirect network externalities between distinct customer groups that evidently 
affect the opposite market side. Thus, the interdependencies of multiple market 
sides matter (Dewenter 2006a: 2). Since more and more industries were identi-
fied to be multisided in recent years a whole theory of multisided markets 
emerged. As already mentioned before, it provides a better understanding of 
multisided markets and opens new perspectives and insights. By showing that 
multiple sides matter it becomes clear that it is not sufficient to determine one 
side exclusively when analyzing markets, such as the credit card market or me-
dia markets. In all cases we face at least three participants – namely the plat-
form and at least two distinct but interdependent market sides. The theory 
shows that the interaction of these participants takes place through the platform 
– who is acting as a coordinator bringing together all market sides by reducing 
their transaction costs. In other words the platform internalizes the existing indi-
rect network externalities among the market sides; something the two (respec-
tively multiple) sides were not able to handle on their own. With this knowl-
edge, the theory provides a better understanding of the platform’s behaviour – 
more precisely understanding its pricing, production, and investment strategies. 
These in turn are crucial parameters for antitrust authorities when coping with 
the evaluation of markets and possible competition constraints. Applying con- 
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ventional antitrust policies that are used in traditional one-sided markets for a 
multisided market would lead to wrong conclusions (Evans 2004: 241, 268, 
294). 
 
In multisided markets we cope with prices and quantities that clearly differ 
from those in one-sided markets – due to the existence of indirect network ex-
ternalities (Dewenter 2006a: 5, Dewenter 2005: 55). Platforms on multisided 
markets have to serve multiple distinct but interdependent market sides. The 
term “getting both sides” on board means that both sides are necessary to gen-
erate demand and hence profit at all. However, often one side need to be at-
tracted more than the other side. This is the case as soon as one side exerts a 
stronger network effect on the opposite side (Evans 2004: 246). Take the media 
market, for example. In the majority of media markets the audience is subsi-
dized by the advertising market. Due to stronger positive indirect network ex-
ternalities that the readership of a newspaper, for example, exerts on the adver-
tising side the former one will be charged less. Thus, a platform will usually set 
low prices (or even no price) on the market side that exerts stronger (positive) 
network effects on both market sides and set higher prices on the opposite side 
(cross-subsidization). By doing so, the indirect network effects can be used op-
timally (Dewenter 2006b: 3, Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 40, 45). This in turn 
means that the optimal price for a platform on one side does not follow mar-
ginal costs. Instead it is the second side that needs to be taken into consideration 
simultaneously (Evans 2004: 238). Figure 4 shows more examples that clearly 
state that in multisided markets almost always one side is charged less than the 
other side. 
 
For antitrust authorities this implies that it is not possible to draw conclusions 
from price setting on one side to the degree of competition or the competitive 
behaviour. That means price setting or price changes on one side of the market 
cannot be evaluated in isolation. Instead, the parameters on all market sides 
have to be considered since the sides are intertwined. As we have learned in 
section 2.2 it is the price structure that matters. Hence, setting prices on one  
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side below marginal costs is not a given sign to predatory pricing. Instead, those 
prices might be set to attract, respectively get profits, from the opposite side. On 
the other hand setting the price on the opposite side above marginal costs does 
not automatically imply market power. The reason instead might be originated 
in low indirect network externalities this side exerts on the opposite side. Thus, 
indirect network externalities lead to the consequences that price equal marginal 
cost does not create optimal social welfare on multisided markets.  Conse-
quently, resulting interventions known from traditional one-sided markets do 
not seem justified in multisided markets. Instead, when evaluating the plat-
form’s pricing strategies the antitrust authorities have to consider all market 
sides. In addition to this, inside each market a careful analysis of the parameters 
demand elasticities, market and cost structures, and especially of the indirect 
network effects is essential (Dewenter 2006a: 6f.; Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 
45-47; Evans 2004: 267-271, 280). 
 
Figure 4.  Own graph, source Evans 2004: 247f. 
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Since it was pointed out, that pricing strategies in multisided markets differ and 
that prices above marginal costs are not automatically a given sign for market 
power this section will have a closer look at market power. It is closely con-
nected with the evaluation of market structures (see paragraph below). With re-
gard to market power identifying possible barriers to entry is quite helpful. In 
the majority of multisided markets, platforms face high fixed costs. Take media 
markets, for example. Very often media markets hold high sunk costs and/or 
large economies of scale. Consequently, building up critical mass is important. 
However, in multisided markets this critical mass is essential for all participated 
sides. This in turn can lead to high barriers to entry. However, high barriers are 
not a given sign for market power. First of all the potential market entry is im-
portant. Secondly, antitrust authorities have to examine the total price in multi-
sided markets when examining possible market power. That means all sides 
have to be taken into account since pricing power for one side depends on the 
competition on all sides.
20 In addition to this, the total returns and total invest-
ments have to be carefully considered as well (Dewenter 2003: 19; Evans: 
2003: 266f., 271-279.; Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 165).  
 
Furthermore, the evaluation of market structures and hence the effects on social 
welfare in multisided markets clearly differ from those in one-sided markets. 
The theory points out that in a monopolistic structure the monopolist can 
probably better internalize the indirect network effects than many companies in 
a competitive environment. This would in turn mean that social welfare could 
probably be higher in a monopolistic market than in a competitive one 
(Dewenter 2006a: 5f.). Would this possibly even favour monopolistic market 
structures in multisided markets? Therefore analysing social welfare and the co-
existing effects market extension effect and the competition effect which lead in 
opposite directions play a crucial role (see 2.5.2). The answer depends on which 
effect outbalances the other one and cannot be answered in a lump sum 
(Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 44). According to Evans (2003) analysing social 
                                                            
20   According to Rochet & Tirole this would mean that multihoming on one market side would intensify 
price competition on the opposite side (Evans 2004: 271).  
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welfare in multisided markets always has to consider the aspects price level, 
price structure as well as possible alternatives to get every side on board.  
 
In order to identify market structures defining the relevant market plays an im-
portant role. Antitrust authorities need the market definition to identify possible 
anti-competitive conduct and to evaluate mergers and acquisitions (Evans 2004: 
268). The theory of multisided markets shows that the definition of the relevant 
market clearly differs from those in one-sided markets. Despite the interde-
pendencies of the multiple market sides it is essential to define each relevant 
market (side) separately. This is no trivial task as the markets do not necessarily 
have to be symmetric (Dewenter & Kaiser 2006b: 348). In the majority of cases 
the relevant competitors on one side of the market clearly differ from those on 
the opposite side. Take the media markets for example: When analysing what a 
reader would substitute for his given newspaper, the most important criteria 
would be content or political position. When coping with possible substitutes 
for the advertising industry on the other hand socio-demographical criteria 
would dominate (Dewenter 2006a: 6; Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 43). Section 
4.2.1 will cope with the arising problems of defining the relevant market.  
4.2.  Open research questions and the concluding need for progressions 
Even though the theory provides a helpful instrument to describe and under-
stand multisided markets there are still problems and obstacles left making an 
easy appliance of the theory not yet possible. This section now draws attention 
to some of those aspects the theory brought to light, but up till now actually 
cannot solve in general. These aspects all result in difficulties and problems for 
antitrust authorities when coping with multisided markets. More precise prob-
lems could occur when determining possible anti-competitive behaviour or 
evaluating mergers and acquisitions in multisided markets.  
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4.2.1.  Definition of the relevant markets 
The first problem arises with the definition of the relevant markets. Defining the 
relevant market plays an essential role for antitrust authorities regarding merger 
evaluations and the examination of anti-competitive behaviour. The established 
approach of antitrust authorities is to initially define a market and subsequently 
evaluate concentration tendencies. A merger is said to be harmful as soon as 
market concentration will substantially increase as a result from that merger. 
Thus, market shares play an important role in the evaluation (Farrell & Shapiro 
2008: 3). However, it seems quite complex to define the relevant market in 
multisided markets. In any case, those markets demand for a definition of the 
relevant competitors for all participated markets. However, these multiple mar-
ket sides do not necessarily need to have the same competitors – seldom are the 
relevant markets symmetric. On media markets (see also 4.1) the relevant mar-
ket for the primary market (audience market) differs from the relevant market 
identified on the secondary market (advertising market). Therefore, the relevant 
markets have to be defined separately (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 43f.; 
Dewenter 2003: 4). If markets are defined according to standard techniques (i.e. 
SSNIP)
21 this will result in several separate markets. This could create a ten-
dency to neglect or underestimate the interdependencies between the two mar-
ket sides (Hesse 2007: 192f.).
22 This might in turn mislead antitrust authorities 
when evaluating pricing strategies. At first glance price setting on the audience 
side of media markets is often associated with predatory pricing. However, this 
price strategy might be assessed to be pro-competitive as soon as the advertis-
ing side is considered – due to the existence of indirect network externalities 
(Just 2009: 106). In merger cases the traditional market definition approach 
might lead to a classification of cross-media mergers as conglomerate mergers. 
This causes some prejudice about likely effects. Due to the multisided character 
the effects of the merger might be essentially horizontal instead of conglomer-
                                                            
21   SSNIP: Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price. 
22   By neglecting the interdependencies of the market sides the antitrust authorities might for example 
come to the conclusion of over-estimating market power on one of these sides (Holland 2007: 14f.).  
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ate (Budzinski 2009b: 3). These described aspects were the results of a static 
definition of markets. However, markets are usually not static but characterized 
by high dynamics (e.g. convergence of the media) (Just 2009: 106, 108f.). This 
in turn means that it is not enough to define the relevant markets of each indus-
try once. Simultaneously, the antitrust authorities must never ignore the inter-
dependencies of the market sides as they in turn influence the platform’s behav-
iour. Bringing together all these factors does not seem a trivial task for antitrust 
authorities but has to be done thoroughly in order to not draw wrong conclu-
sions (Evans 2004: 268-271). 
 
Therefore, the question needs to be raised if market definition is actually help-
ful to evaluate anti-competitive behaviour and mergers in multisided markets. 
The peculiarities of multisided markets tend to support approaches like such of 
Farrell & Shapiro (2008). Those two authors question if market definition is 
still the right instrument for antitrust policy when facing markets with differen-
tiated products. Thus, Farrell and Shapiro move away from the market defini-
tion approach and instead head towards a direct analysis of competition ef-
fects.
23 Evaluating mergers on multisided markets only according to the market 
definition approach might lead to wrong conclusions as well – due to the spe-
cial characteristics on those markets. It was already stated that a platform usu-
ally charges both sides differently and that pricing does not follow marginal 
costs. If, due to a merger of two multisided platforms one market side (e.g. ad-
vertising market) experiences price increases this does not automatically have 
to be harmful. Instead, the other market side (audience side) has to be carefully 
evaluated as well. As a result, it might be insufficient to concentrate on the pure 
market definition approach in multisided markets. Considering Farrell’s and 
Shapiro’s approach might be a helpful extension.  
                                                            
23   For a detailed description of this approach please refer to Farrell & Shapiro (2008).  
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4.2.2. Measuring  indirect network externalities 
The second problematic issue is the difficulty of measurement. It is no trivial 
task to determine the exact strengths and relations of the indirect network ex-
ternalities. These externalities have a great influence on price and quantity set-
ting of the platform and also play an important role with regard to the evalua-
tion of antitrust matters. However, they are quite complex to identify (Evans & 
Schmalensee 2007: 159; Evans 2004: 257f., 286f., Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 
47). Anyhow, it would be helpful to have some methods of measurements. The 
first suggestion is to theoretically split the interdependent markets and try to as-
sume which prices would be set on each side if both markets where independ-
ent. By comparing these prices with the actual prices set by the multisided plat-
form it could at least give an idea which market side exerts a stronger external-
ity on the opposite side. Since more industries are said to be multisided a com-
parison of different industries might be another helpful approach. This might be 
done by trying to observe similarities between industries. Then, the known 
strengths and relation of the indirect network externalities in one industry could 
be (partly) applied to another one. However, this assumes that network exter-
nalities and its strengths and relations are already well-known on at least some 
markets. Another approach could be to compare and look for similarities within 
the industries over a specific period of time. Platforms in one industry usually 
have to cope with the same network effects. It could be helpful to draw conclu-
sions on the network externalities and their strengths and relations by compar-
ing the price setting of various platforms in this industry over time. Did price 
changes occur? If so, how was the price changed on each side, and what effects 
did this have on the network size of agents on both sides. The question is if 
network externalities can even be estimated by looking at the “cross quantity 
elasticity”? In other words, what change in quantity demanded will result on 
market side A as soon as the price on market side B is changed? However, if 
analyzing these elasticities could be a helpful approach to identify the network 
externalities then it is essential to determine which data would be necessary to 
collect.  
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However, network externalities are not the only parameter. Furthermore, in or-
der to make a statement regarding the competitive environment and possible 
competition constraints it is not sufficient to use simple pricing data. Otherwise, 
pricing strategies of a platform cannot be understood and judged accurately. In 
addition to the network effects it is the solid knowledge of aspects such as de-
mand elasticities, cost structures, and the market structures that play a crucial 
role as it was emphasized in previous parts of this paper. Moreover, this solid 
knowledge has to be gained for all market sides. The interdependencies of the 
markets always have to be considered. Analysing all those aspects however 
demand for a thorough and time-consuming empirical analysis (Dewenter 
2006a: 6f.; Evans 2004: 269). 
4.2.3.  Lack of general conclusions for antitrust policy 
A third possible problem we are currently facing in multisided markets is the 
lack of general conclusions. The same as in one-sided markets we also have to 
cope with competition concerns in multisided markets (Holland 2007: 12f.). 
However, it was already pointed out that – due to the peculiarities of multisided 
markets – the hitherto antitrust policies known from one-sided markets would 
draw wrong conclusions. Even though the theory of multisided markets pro-
vides helpful implications that need to be considered by the antitrust authorities 
it just gives guidance. The theory does not provide general conclusions and 
statements yet. Neither regarding price setting, market power, predatory pricing 
nor social welfare. This is especially due to the fact that the indirect network 
externalities, how they come into effect and the strengths and relations cannot 
be judged in a lump sum – sometimes the effects are positive, sometimes they 
are negative,
24 sometimes they are stronger, other times weaker (Dewenter & 
Haucap 2009: 68f.; Dewenter & Kaiser 2006a: 21f.). Hence, the antitrust au-
thorities have to analyze each case individually and need to have a solid knowl-
edge of all relevant market parameters before coming to a conclusion (Evans 
                                                            
24   This is especially true for media markets and the influence of advertising on the audience (Dewenter 
& Haucap 2009: 68f.).  
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2004: 239-241, 294; Evans & Schmalensee 2007: 159; Dewenter & Haucap 
2009: 44-49, 68f.). The lack of general conclusions could be problematic in two 
ways. First of all analyzing each case individually is extremely time-consuming 
and furthermore causes high costs. The antitrust authorities have to determine 
every single case before drawing a conclusion. Since meanwhile more and more 
industries are said to be multisided this might result in a capacity overload of 
the antitrust authorities. This in turn could have the following effects: either the 
cases are not analyzed thoroughly enough which might draw wrong conclu-
sions. Or some evaluation of mergers might be postponed which causes a delay 
in mergers – thus also for those that might have positive effects on the econ-
omy. Secondly, it seems quite complex to have a solid knowledge of all rele-
vant parameters. Usually the parameters are not static but do change over the 
time. This again goes closely together with the time problem antitrust authori-
ties do face. In order to gain a solid knowledge the merger analysis in multi-
sided markets needs to be done thoroughly on the one hand; this requires time. 
On the other hand the evaluation has to be done as fast as possible in order to 
not have a change in any of the already analyzed parameters. General conclu-
sions regarding antitrust policies in multisided markets would overcome these 
problems. However, is it even possible to establish general conclusions in mul-
tisided markets? 
 
According to Hayek competition is a discovery procedure (Hayek 1978; Kerber 
2003; Schmidtchen & Kirstein 2001). Every participant in the market faces 
knowledge problems due to the lack of perfect information. However, these 
problems can be solved with the help of competition. Competition thereby 
represents a trial-and-error-process with what the optimal results will be ob-
served. If this is the case how shall antitrust authorities handle competition is-
sues? To which extent do we need general rules without taking the risk of limit-
ing optimal results? Hence, the relevant question is if we need general conclu-
sions in the way of per se rules or if it is instead the rule of reason approach 
that represents the right instrument for antitrust authorities to evaluate competi-
tion on multisided markets. Or is it possibly even something in between those  
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two approaches? In general the US and the EU antitrust policies tend to stick 
more to the rule of reasons instead of the per se rules throughout the last years 
(Christiansen & Kerber 2006: 216). There are certainly advantages as well as 
disadvantages with both approaches which are shortly pointed out in the follow-
ing.
25 The rule of reason approach tends to analyze each case individually 
whereas the per se rules approach sets up rules for antitrust authorities that they 
follow when evaluating competition issues. The advantage of the latter one is 
that antitrust authorities have a guideline they can stick to and costs as well as 
resources (time, personnel) are reduced. However, antitrust authorities simulta-
neously take the risk to draw wrong conclusions due to the knowledge problem. 
In addition to this, a plain per se rule does not consider any individual effects at 
all (Christiansen & Kerber 2006: 221). The rule of reason approach on the other 
hand reduces or even avoids the risk of drawing wrong conclusions since every 
case is individually and thoroughly analyzed. However, this implies the need 
for enormous costs and resources. To conclude, both approaches have its pros 
and cons; therefore it could be helpful to combine them. Christiansen & Kerber 
(2006) suggest a competition policy with optimally differentiated rules. That is 
having a certain set of rules which are applied but additionally leaving space for 
case specific analyses in order to do justice for the differentiation of individual 
cases.
26 This solution has two advantages. On the one hand it considers differ-
ences and complexity – missing when applying only per se rules. On the other 
hand it limits the time and costs spent for purely single case analysis 
(Christiansen & Kerber: 220-222, 239f.).  
 
This approach could be also suitable for antitrust authorities when evaluating 
competition issues on multisided markets. By doing so the above mentioned 
problems faced with solely single case interpretation – especially time and costs 
– could be overcome by having a certain set of general rules. In addition to this, 
the complexity of multisided markets – especially the differences in strengths 
                                                            
25   For a more detailed presentation please refer to Christiansen & Kerber (2006). 
26   Case specific analyses is thereby justified as long as the marginal benefits of doing so outweigh the 
marginal costs (Christiansen & Kerber 2006: 237).  
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and relations of indirect network externalities (see section 4.2.2) – would be 
taken into account as well since antitrust authorities could additionally focus on 
an individual case analysis where necessary. This seems to be quite important 
since even within multisided markets the exact structures and characteristics 
can differ from each other significantly. However, for applying this approach, 
especially in order to establish a certain set of rules (i.e. guidelines) further re-
search on multisided markets will be indispensable. 
4.2.4.  Competition effects on the diversity of opinion in media mar-
kets 
Finally we are coping with another problem particularly occurring on media 
markets. It was already pointed out that media markets are typically character-
ized by high sunk costs, large economies of scale as well as strong indirect net-
work externalities – aspects that lead to concentration tendencies on those mar-
kets (Dewenter 2003: 18f.). Furthermore there were many cases regarding 
mergers that the antitrust policies had to evaluate in recent years.
27 This con-
cerns the national antitrust authorities as well as the European antitrust authori-
ties, i.e. the European Commission.
28 However, when evaluating mergers in 
media markets it is not only the impact on social welfare and competition that 
has to be evaluated. In the introduction of this paper it was stated that media can 
impart knowledge and can shape public opinion (Anderson & Gabszewicz 
2006: 569). Therefore, the media fulfils a dual function. As Just (2009: 98) puts 
it: “Media products and services are simultaneously economic and cultural 
goods [...].” This fact concerns antitrust authorities when coping with the 
                                                            
27   Two examples were: 1) In Germany the intended merger of Springer-ProSiebenSat1 that was finally 
prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt (Budzinski & Wacker 2007). 2) In Italy the proposed and by the 
European Commission finally permitted merger – even though with several regulatory requirements – 
of Telepiù and Stream (Budzinski 2009a: 337-361). 
28  Especially in media markets both, the national antitrust laws and the European antitrust laws hold 
(Budzinski 2009a; Beck & Wentzel 2009). However, the competence thereby should be non-
competing. Usually the European Commission is in charge as soon as the merger becomes important 
for the European Union. For a more detailed explanation of this term and the conditions see Budzin-
ski 2009a: 339-341.  
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evaluation of mergers. More precisely, we face two kinds of competition on 
media markets: economic competition (regarding the market structure) on the 
one hand and competition on the diversity of opinion (journalistic pluralism and 
diversity) on the other hand. Therefore, the authorities need to cope with the 
consequences a merger has on the diversity of media and additionally the diver-
sity of opinion.
29 Not surprisingly a broad literature has occurred in recent years 
coping with this issue. However, it is still an open research question how eco-
nomic competition and diversity of opinion are concretely connected with each 
other. Nevertheless, it needs to be taken into account for the analysis of media 
markets very thoroughly. Regarding the diversity of opinion (journalistic plural-
ism) it is the overall aim that media represent the majority of opinions people 
have in the society (Budzinski 2009a: 341f.). Hence, the question arises which 
market structure will lead to more diversity of opinion? Is it competition that 
leads to a greater diversity or a monopolistic structure? Closely connected to 
this is the issue of media bias and the question if competition or concentration 
tendencies lead to more biased media coverage (Dewenter & Haucap 2009: 




                                                            
29   The primal objective of the merger control by the European Commission is to mainly focus on the re-
sulting effects on (economic) competition and its changing structure and that the media pluralism ef-
fects should be the task of the member states (e.g. in Germany the KEK (Kommission zur Ermittlung 
der Konzentration im Medienbereich), a regulatory agency that is in charge of ensuring diversity of 
opinion in German national broadcasting) (Just 2009: 99f., 110; Dewenter 2007: 48). However, in the 
1990s the EU argued that the antitrust authorities should take a pro-active role regarding the protec-
tion of the journalistic pluralism when evaluating mergers (Budzinski 2009a: 346). Nowadays it 
seems quite different to what extent the antitrust authorities integrate this issues when evaluating 
merger cases. In some cases – even though it was not argued with that explicitly – the resulting im-
pact a merger could have on the journalistic diversity supposedly have played some role. An example 
would be the case of Springer-ProSiebenSat1 that was prohibited by the Bundeskartellamt – the na-
tional antitrust authority in Germany (Budzinski & Wacker 2007). In other cases the consequences of 
a merger on the journalistic diversity did not seem to have played an essential role – which would be 
valid for example in the Telepiù case that was evaluated by the European Commission (Budzinski 
2009a: 337-361). 
30   For a detailed overview please refer to the original literature of the mentioned authors.  
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Mullainathan & Shleifer (2005) differentiate between homogeneous and het-
erogeneous consumers regarding their preferences of (un)biased news coverage. 
They bring this into connection with the media companies’ strategies of produc-
ing media bias in different market structures. The authors argue that a monopo-
list has fewer intentions to produce media bias. Hence, according to them re-
ducing economic competition has a positive effect on the diversity of opinion. 
Burke (2008) says that as long as consumers have preferences for biased (‘be-
lief confirming’) information more competition leads to more media bias. How-
ever, this in turn leads to more social welfare due to a greater preferred offer. 
Xiang & Sarvary (2006) argue that competition is helpful for consumers. The 
stronger (compared to a monopolistic situation) media bias in a competitive en-
vironment acts as a signal and finally leads to more true information as in a 
monopolistic situation. Gentkow & Shapiro (2005) and Anderson & McLaren 
(2007) assume information asymmetries for the consumers meaning that con-
sumers cannot clearly identify information to be true or false. Less competition 
reinforces this effect that finally leads to more market power of opinion. Corneo 
(2006) and Anderson & McLaren (2007) give up the assumption that media 
companies strictly aim for maximizing profits. Instead, the utility function of 
media companies also includes political and social goals. Hence, growing eco-
nomic market power will result in growing (journalistic) power of opinion. The 
degree depends on how much consumers are influenced by a monopolistic me-
dia bias. According to Dewenter (2007) the existence of political and/or social 
goals in private companies is plausible, however, in corporate entities (espe-
cially when coping with widespread shareholdings) to a lesser extent. This is 
due to a trade-off between political or social goals and economic goals. Assum-
ing that there are several stockholders with small shares the economic goals 
would dominate. This is because economic goals are more agreeable than po-
litical or social ones. However, in this case we might face a principal agent 
problem between shareholders and managers. Baron (2006) and Bernhardt et al. 
(2008) argue that the trade-off between economic and social or political goals is 
not automatically given. Instead media bias could even be a profit maximizing  
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strategy. At last according to DellaVigna & Kaplan (2007) empirical analyses 
state that there is a significant influence of media bias on consumer preferences.  
 
This short overview of diverse opinions regarding media bias and diversity of 
opinion clearly show that this is still an open issue in media markets. It needs 
and surely will be further analyzed in the future. Moreover, the economic litera-
ture on media bias and the theory of multisided markets have not yet been com-
bined. This means, up to now these two theories are used and applied only sepa-
rately. However, a combination of these two approaches might lead to further 
interesting insights. For doing so, additional research is again indispensable. 
5.  Conclusion 
The theory of multisided markets became quite popular in recent years. It has 
initially been used to explain the work of credit card markets. However, mean-
while more and more industries have been identified to be multisided – media 
markets as well. Multisided markets face at least two market sides and a plat-
form. The former ones are distinct but interdependent which can be attributed to 
the existence of indirect network externalities. The platform in contrast acts as a 
coordinator that is bringing both sides together while optimally using these in-
direct network externalities. 
 
The theory of multisided markets identifies the main differences to traditional 
one-sided markets and thus provides helpful perspectives and insights in under-
standing these kinds of markets. Those peculiarities especially have to be con-
sidered by the antitrust authorities as the hitherto existing antitrust policy 
known from one-sided markets cannot be applied to multisided markets. With 
regards to media markets the emerged theory provides a better understanding as 
to why advertising markets are mostly charged quite a high advertising price 
whereas the audience is charged little. Thereby it reveals that this is neither a 
given sign for market power nor for predatory pricing.  
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However, there are still open issues left which demand further research. This is 
especially given for the evaluation of antitrust matters. Up to now, the theory 
can only give guidance on how to deal with such issues in multisided markets. 
However, the final evaluation of antitrust cases still has to be done through 
thorough analyses of each individual case. This is among other things the case 
for defining the relevant markets or identifying the strengths and relations of 
indirect network externalities. With special regard to media markets it is still an 
open research question on how to combine economic competition and the com-
petition on diversity of opinion. Up to now the two economic theory strings – 
the theory of multisided markets and the theory of media bias – do not yet em-
brace each other. Hence, there surely will be further works on multisided mar-
kets in the near future. They will on the one hand identify more industries to be 
multisided. On the other hand they will try to further develop the theory of mul-
tisided markets to solve the above mentioned open issues. 
  
49 
6.  References 
Anderson, S. P.; Gabszewicz, J. J. (2006): The media and advertising: a tale of 
two-sided markets, in: Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, ed. by 
Victor A. Ginsburgh and David Throsby, Elsevier Science,, Vol 1: 567-614, 
2006. 
 
Anderson, S.; McLaren, J. (2007): Media Mergers and Media Bias with Ra-
tional Consumers, Working Paper, University of Virginia. 
 
Armstrong, M. (2006): Competition in two-sided markets, in: The Rand Journal 
of Economics, ISSN 0741-6261, Bd. 37 (2006), 3: 668-691. 
 





Beyer, A.; Carl, P. (2008): Einführung in die Medienökonomie, 2. Auflage, 
UVK Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Konstanz 2008. 
 
Beck, H. (2005): Medienökonomie Print, Fernsehen und Multimedia, Zweite, 
überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage, Springer Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, März 
2005.  
 
Beck, H., Wentzel, D. (2009): Medienökonomik – Neuere Entwicklungen und 
Ordnungsfragen, in D. Wentzel (ed.), Medienökonomik: Theoretische Grundla-
gen und ordnungspolitische Gestaltungsalternativen, Veröffentlichung des 41. 
Forschungsseminar Radein 2008, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2009: 3-32. 
  
50 
Budzinski, O. & Wacker, K. (2007): The Prohibition of the Proposed Springer-
ProSiebenSat.1-Merger: How much Economics in German Merger Control?, in: 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 3 (2), S. 281-306. 
 
Budzinski, O. (2009a): Europäische Medienmärkte: Die Rolle der Wettbewerb-
spolitik, in D. Wentzel (ed.), Medienökonomik: Theoretische Grundlagen und 
ordnungspolitische Gestaltungsalternativen, Veröffentlichung des 41. For-
schungsseminar Radein 2008, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2009: 337-361. 
 
Budzinski, O. (2009b): Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: 
Open Problems and Possible Limits, SSRN Working Paper Series 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420855. 
 
Budzinski, O. & Satzer, J. (2009): Sports Business and the Theory of Two-
Sided Markets, IME Working Paper 85/09, Esbjerg. 
 
Budzinski, O. & Lindstädt, N. (2009): Neuere Entwicklungen in der Medienö-
konomik: Das Konzept der mehrseitigen Märkte, SSRN Working Paper Series, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403137 (27.08.2009). 
 
Baron, D.P. (2006): Persistent Media Bias, Journal of Political Economy 90 (1): 
1-36. 
 
Bernhardt D.; Krasa, S.; Polborn M. (2008): Political Polarization and the Elec-
toral Effects of Media Bias, Journal of Public Economics 92 (5-6): 1092-1104. 
 
Burke J. (2008): Primetime Spin: Media Bias and Belief Confirming Informa-
tion, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 17 (3): 633-665.  
 
Caillaud, B.; Jullien, B. (2003): Chicken & egg: competition among intermedia-
tion service providers, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2 
(Summer 2003): 309-328.  
51 
Corneo, G. (2006): Media Capture in a Democracy, Journal of Public Econom-
ics 90 (1-2): 37-58. 
 
Crampes, C.; Haritchabalet, C.; Jullien, B. (2005): Advertising, competition and 
entry in media industries, in: Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.], CESifo 
working paper No.1591: Industrial organisation, Munich. 
 
Christiansen, A.; Kerber, W. (2006): Competition policy with optimally differ-
entiated rules instead of “per se rules vs rule of reason” in: Journal of Competi-
tion Law and Economics 2 (2), 215-244. 
 
DellaVigna, S.; Kaplan, E. (2007): The Fox news Effect: Media Bias and Vot-
ing, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (3): 1187-1234. 
 
Dewenter, R. (2003): The Economics of Media Markets, Helmut Schmidt Uni-
versität, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre, Diskussionspapier Nr. 10, Juni 
2003. 
 
Dewenter, R.; Kaiser, U. (2006a): Anmerkungen zur ökonomischen Bewertung 
von Fusionen auf dem Printmedienmarkt, in: ZEW Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Discussion Paper No. 05-92, Mannheim. 
 
Dewenter, R.; Kaiser, U. (2006b): Horizontale Fusionen auf zweiseitigen Märk-
ten am Beispiel von Printmedien, in Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 2006 
7/3: 335-353. 
 
Dewenter, R. (2006a): Two-sided markets, MedienWirtschaft, Zeitschrift für 
Medienmanagement und Kommunikationsökonomie, 2/2006. 
 
Dewenter, R. (2006b): Das Konzept der zweiseitigen Märkte am Beispiel von 
Zeitungsmonopolen, Helmut Schmidt Universität, Fächergruppe 
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Diskussionspapier Nr. 53, November 2006.  
52 
Dewenter, R. (2007): Crossmediale Fusionen und Meinungsvielfalt: Eine öko-
nomische Analyse, in. F. Fechner (Hrsg.), Crossmediale Fusionen und Mein-
ungsvielfalt, Ilmenau: Universitätsverlage, 47-89. 
 
Dewenter, R.; Haucap, J. (2009): Wettbewerb als Aufgabe und Problem auf 
Medienmärkten: Fallstudien aus Sicht der ‚Theorie zweiseitiger Märkte’, in D. 
Wentzel (ed.), Medienökonomik: Theoretische Grundlagen und ordnungspoli-
tische Gestaltungsalternativen, Veröffentlichung des 41. Forschungsseminar 
Radein 2008, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2009: 36-73. 
 
Evans, D. S. (2002): The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets, AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. 
 
Evans, D. S. (2003): Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Indus-
tries, in: Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, Issue 3: 191-209. 
 
Evans, D. S. (2004): The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Mar-
kets, in: LECG Global Competition Policy: Economic Issues & Impacts, Chap-
ter 8: 237-294. (Previously published in Yale Journal of Regulation, Vol. 20 
2003: 325-382).  
 
Evans, D. S.; Schmalensee, R.(2005): The Economics of Interchange Fees amd 
their regulation: An overview, Conference Proceedings on the Conference „In-
terchange fees in credit and debit card industries: what role for public authori-
ties?“ in: Proceedings – Payments System Research Conferences, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City, 73-120.  
 
Evans, D. S. & Schmalensee, R. (2007): The Industrial Organization of Markets 




Farrell, J.; Shapiro, C. (2008): Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An 
Economic Alternative to Market Definition, Working Paper, URL: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1313782. 
 
Ferrando, J.; Gabszewicz, J. J. et al. (2003): Two-sided Network Effects and 
Competition: An application to Media Industries; Working Paper, 
http://atom.univ-paris1.fr/documents/seance_4_(texte)_Pierre.pdf (30.03.09). 
 
Gentkow M. A.; Shapiro, J. M. (2005): Media Bias and Reputation, Journal of 
Political Economy 114 (2): 280-316. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1978): Competition as a Discovery Procedure, pp. 179-190 in von 
Hayek, F.A. (ed.), New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the His-
tory of Ideas, Chicago, Chicago University Press (first published in German in 
1968: Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, Kieler Vorträge, Neue Folge 
56, Kiel). 
 
Heinrich, J. (2001): Medienökonomie. Band 1: Mediensystem, Zeitung, 
Zeitschrift, Anzeigenblatt. 2. überarbeitete und aktualisierte Auflage, West-
deutscher Verlag, Mai 2001. 
 
Hesse, R.B. (2007): Two-Sided Platform Markets and the Application of the 
Traditional Antitrust Analytical Framework, in: Competition Policy Interna-
tional, Vol. 3 (1): 191-195. 
 
Holland, M. (2007): Two-Sided Markets: A Challenge to Competition Policy?, 
Conference Paper for the First Annual Competition Commission, Competition 
Tribunal and Mandela Institute Conference on Competition Law, Economics 





Hoskin, C.; McFadyen, S.; Finn, A. (2004): Media Economics Applying Eco-
nomics to New and Traditional Media, Sage Publications, California, 2004. 
 
Just, N. (2009): Measuring media concentration and diversity: new approaches 
and instruments in Europe and the US, in: Media Culture & Society, Vol. 31 
(1): 97-117. 
 
Kaiser, U.; Wright, J. (2006): Price structure in two-sided markets: evidence 
from the magazine industry, International journal of industrial organization, 
ISSN 0167-7187, Bd. 24 (2006), 1: 1-28. 
 
Kerber, W. (2003): Wettbewerbspolitik, in: Vahlens Kompendium der 
Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik, Band 2, 8. Auflage, München: Ver-
lag Vahlen, 297-361. 
 
Mullainathan S.; Shleifer, A. (2005): The Market for News, American Eco-
nomic Review 95 (4): 1031-1053. 
 
Rochet, J. C.; Tirole, J. (2003): Platform competition in two-sided markets, 
Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, Bd. 1 (2003), 
4: 990-1029. 
 
Rochet, , J. C; Tirole, J. (2004): Defining Two-Sided Markets, Conference Pa-
per for the IDEI-CEPR conference on two-sided markets (Toulouse, January 
23-24, 2004). www.brousseau.info/semnum/pdf/2004-03-01_tirole.pdf 
(02.03.2009). 
 
Rochet, J. C.; Tirole, J. (2006): Two-sided markets: A progress report, The 
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn, 2006): 645-667. 
 
Roson, R. (2005): Two-sided Markets: A tentative survey, Review of Network 
Economics, Vol. 4, Issue 2, June 2005: 142-160.  
55 
Schmidtchen, D.; Kirstein R. (2001): Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren, 
Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Discussion Paper 2001-02, 
http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2007/5766/pdf/2001-02_wb.pdf (05.06.2009). 
 
Schmiedtke, R. (2006): Two-sided markets with pecuniary and participation ex-
ternalities, Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.], CESifo working paper 
No.1776: Industrial organisation, Munich. 
 
Wotton, J. (2007): Are Media Markets analyzed as Two-Sided Markets?, Com-
petition Policy International, Vol. 3 (1): 237-247. 
 
Xiang Y.; Sarvary M. (2006): News Consumption and Media Bias, INSEAD 







Department of Environmental and Business Economics 
Institut for Miljø- og Erhvervsøkonomi (IME) 
 
 





Issued working papers from IME 
Udgivne arbejdspapirer fra IME 
No.    
1/99  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Hans Frost 
Asymmetrisk information og regulering af for-
urening 
2/99 Finn  Olesen  Monetær integration i EU 
3/99 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Regulation of Renewable Resources in Fed-
eral Systems: The Case of Fishery in the EU 
4/99 Villy  Søgaard  The Development of Organic Farming in 
Europe 
5/99 Teit  Lüthje 
Finn Olesen 
EU som handelsskabende faktor? 
6/99  Carsten Lynge Jensen  A Critical Review of the Common Fisheries 
Policy 
7/00  Carsten Lynge Jensen  Output Substitution in a Regulated Fishery 
8/00 Finn  Olesen  Jørgen Henrik Gelting – En betydende dansk 
keynesianer 
9/00 Frank  Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regula-
tion: The Case of Illegal Landings 
10/00 Finn  Olesen  Moral, etik og økonomi  
57 
11/00 Birgit  Nahrstedt  Legal Aspect of Border Commuting in the 
Danish-German Border Region 
12/00 Finn  Olesen  Om Økonomi, matematik og videnskabelighed 
- et bud på provokation 
13/00  Finn Olesen 
Jørgen Drud Hansen 
European Integration: Some stylised facts 
14/01  Lone Grønbæk  Fishery Economics and Game Theory 
15/01  Finn Olesen  Jørgen Pedersen on fiscal policy - A note 
16/01  Frank Jensen  A Critical Review of the Fisheries Policy: To-
tal Allowable Catches and Rations for Cod in 
the North Sea 
17/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Are uniform solutions focal? The case of in-
ternational environmental agreements 
18/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Group Uniform Solutions 
19/01  Frank Jensen  Prices versus Quantities for Common Pool 
Resources 
20/01  Urs Steiner Brandt  Uniform Reductions are not that Bad 
21/01  Finn Olesen 
Frank Jensen 
A note on Marx 
22/01  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Hot air in Kyoto, cold air in The Hague 
23/01  Finn Olesen  Den marginalistiske revolution: En dansk spi-
re der ikke slog rod? 
24/01  Tommy Poulsen  Skattekonkurrence og EU's skattestruktur 
25/01  Knud Sinding  Environmental Management Systems as 
Sources of Competitive Advantage 
26/01  Finn Olesen  On Machinery. Tog Ricardo fejl? 
27/01  Finn Olesen  Ernst Brandes: Samfundsspørgsmaal - en kri-
tik af Malthus og Ricardo 
28/01  Henrik Herlau 
Helge Tetzschner 
Securing Knowledge Assets in the Early Phase 
of Innovation  
58 
29/02  Finn Olesen  Økonomisk teorihistorie  
Overflødig information eller brugbar ballast? 
30/02  Finn Olesen  Om god økonomisk metode 
– beskrivelse af et lukket eller et åbent socialt 
system? 
31/02  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak  The Dynamics of an Open Access: The case of 
the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery – A Strategic Ap-
proach - 
32/02  Niels Vestergaard 
Dale Squires 
Frank Jensen 
Jesper Levring Andersen 
Technical Efficiency of the Danish Trawl fleet: 
Are the Industrial Vessels Better Than Others?
33/02  Birgit Nahrstedt 
Henning P. Jørgensen 
Ayoe Hoff 
Estimation of Production Functions on Fish-
ery: A Danish Survey 
34/02  Hans Jørgen Skriver  Organisationskulturens betydning for videns-
delingen mellem daginstitutionsledere i Varde 
Kommune 
35/02  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case of 
GHG trade in the EU 
36/02  Philip Peck 
Knud Sinding 
Environmental and Social Disclosure and 
Data-Richness in the Mining Industry 
37/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests 
and global climate negotiations 
38/03  Finn Olesen  Ivar Jantzen – ingeniøren, som beskæftigede 
sig med økonomi 
39/03  Finn Olesen  Jens Warming: den miskendte økonom 
40/03  Urs Steiner Brandt  Unilateral actions, the case of international 
environmental problems 
41/03  Finn Olesen  Isi Grünbaum: den politiske økonom 
42/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrange-
ment: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved 
the Kyoto-Agreement?  
59 
43/03  Frank Jensen 
Max Nielsen 
Eva Roth 
Application of the Inverse Almost Ideal De-
mand System to Welfare Analysis 
44/03  Finn Olesen  Rudolf Christiani – en interessant rigsdags-
mand? 
45/03  Finn Olesen  Kjeld Philip – en økonom som også blev poli-
tiker 
46/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
Bureaucratic Rent-Seeking in the European 
Union 
47/03  Bodil Stilling Blichfeldt  Unmanageable Tourism Destination Brands?
48/03  Eva Roth 
Susanne Jensen 
Impact of recreational fishery on the formal 
Danish economy 
49/03  Helge Tetzschner 
Henrik Herlau 
Innovation and social entrepreneurship in 
tourism - A potential for local business de-
velopment? 
50/03  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Marko Lindroos 
An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen 
and Authorities forming Coalitions 
51/03  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Gert Tinggaard Svendsen 
The Political Economy of Climate Change 
Policy in the EU: Auction and Grandfather-
ing 
52/03  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Review of Mathematical Programming for 
Coastal Land Use Optimization 
53/04  Max Nielsen 
Frank Jensen 
Eva Roth 
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Public Labelling 
Scheme of Fish Quality 
54/04  Frank Jensen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Fisheries Management with Multiple Market 
Failures 







56/04  Bodil Stilling Blichfeldt  Approaches of Fast Moving Consumer Good 
Brand Manufacturers Product Development 
“Safe players” versus “Productors”: Impli-
cations for Retailers’ Management of Manu-
facturer Relations 
57/04  Svend Ole Madsen 
Ole Stegmann Mikkelsen 
Interactions between HQ and divisions in a 
MNC 
- Some consequences of IT implementation on 
organizing supply activities 
58/04  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Frank Jensen 
Lars Gårn Hansen 
Niels Vestergaard 
Ratcheting in Renewable Resources Con-
tracting 
59/04  Pernille Eskerod 
Anna Lund Jepsen 
Voluntary Enrolment – A Viable Way of Staff-
ing Projects? 
60/04  Finn Olesen  Den prækeynesianske Malthus 
61/05  Ragnar Arnason 
Leif K. Sandal 
Stein Ivar Steinshamn 
Niels Vestergaard 
Actual versus Optimal Fisheries Policies: An 
Evaluation of the Cod Fishing Policies of 
Denmark, Iceland and Norway 
62/05  Bodil Stilling Blichfeldt 
Jesper Rank Andersen 
On Research in Action and Action in Re-
search 
63/05  Urs Steiner Brandt  Lobbyism and Climate Change in Fisheries: 
A Political Support Function Approach 
64/05  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  An Optimal Corrective Tax for Thai Shrimp 
Farming 
65/05  Henning P. Jørgensen 
Kurt Hjort-Gregersen 
Socio-economic impact in a region in the 
southern part of Jutland by the establishment 
of a plant for processing of bio ethanol 
66/05  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Options and Tradeoffs in Krabi’s Coastal 
Land Use  
61 
67/06  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Optimal Coastal Land Use and Management 
in Krabi, Thailand: Compromise Program-
ming Approach 
68/06  Anna Lund Jepsen 
Svend Ole Madsen 
Developing competences designed to create 
customer value 
69/06  Finn Olesen  Værdifri samfundsvidenskab? - nogle reflek-
sioner om økonomi 
70/06  Tipparat Pongthanapanich  Toward Environmental Responsibility of Thai 
Shrimp Farming through a Voluntary Man-
agement Scheme 
71/06  Finn Olesen  Rational Economic Man og Bounded Ratio-
nality – Nogle betragtninger over rationali-
tetsbegrebet i økonomisk teori 
72/06  Urs Steiner Brandt  The Effect of Climate Change on the Proba-
bility of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation 
as a Policy Contest 
73/06  Urs Steiner Brandt 
Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate 
Change. The Case of International Fisheries 
Agreements 
74/06  Finn Olesen  Lange and his 1938-contribution – An early 
Keynesian 
75/07  Finn Olesen  Kritisk realisme og post keynesianisme. 
76/07  Finn Olesen  Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis – A 
note on a 1963 Post Keynesian Macroeco-
nomic textbook 
77/07  Finn Olesen  Betydningen af Keynes’ metodologi for aktuel 
makroøkonomisk forskning – En Ph.D. fore-
læsning  
78/08  Urs Steiner Brandt  Håndtering af usikkerhed og betydningen af 
innovationer i klimaproblematikken: Med 
udgangspunkt i Stern rapporten 
79/08  Lone Grønbæk Kronbak 
Marko Lindroos 
On Species Preservation and Non-
Cooperative Exploiters  
62 
80/08  Urs Steiner Brandt  What can facilitate cooperation: Fairness, 
ineaulity aversion, punishment, norms or 
trust? 
81/08  Finn Olesen  Heterodoks skepsis – om matematisk 
formalisme i økonomi 
82/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Isabel Ruhmer 
Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A 
Survey 
83/09  Oliver Budzinski  An International Multilevel Competition Pol-
icy System 
84/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer 
Implications of Unprofitable Horizontal 
Mergers: A Positive External Effect Does Not 
Suffice To Clear A Merger! 
85/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Janina Satzer 
Sports Business and the Theory of Multisided 
Markets 
86/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  Ecosystem Management – A Management 
View 
87/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  A Size-Based Ecosystem Model 
88/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  Intertemporal Choice of Marine Ecosystem 
Exploitation 
89/09  Lars Ravn-Jonsen  The Stock Concept Applicability for the Eco-
nomic Evaluation of Marine Ecosystem Ex-
ploitation 
90/09  Oliver Budzinski 
Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer 
Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemploy-
ment, and Welfare 
91/09  Finn Olesen  A Treatise on Money – et teorihistorisk case 
studie 
92/09  Jurijs Grizans  Urban Issues and Solutions in the Context of 
Sustainable Development. A review of the lit-
erature 
93/09  Oliver Budzinski  Modern Industrial Economics and Competition 
Policy: Open Problems and Possible limits  
63 
94/09  Thanh Viet Nguyen  Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management: A 
Critical Review of Concepts and Ecological 
Economic Models 
95/09  Finn Olesen  History matters – om især den tyske historiske 
skole 
96/09  Nadine Lindstädt  Multisided Media Markets: Applying the 
Theory of Multisided Markets to Media Mar-
kets 
 
 